 000174671
 Page: 1     of 27
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1993
 Document 2 of 19                                                 Page   1
 Classification:   UNCLASSIFIED       Status:        [STAT]
 Document Date:    01 May 93          Category:      [CAT]
 Report Type:      JPRS report        Report Date:
 Report Number:    JPRS-EER-93-078-S  UDC Number:
 Author(s):   Col. Marian Kopczewski, Ph.D., of the Higher Officers
 School of Antiaircraft Defense, on the political
 conditionings of a military threat to the Republic of
 Poland: "Directions of Change in the Air Defense of
 Central European Countries Following the Transformation
 of Their Systems of Society"]
 Headline:  * New Air Defense Structure, Direction Viewed
 Source Line:    93EP0305A Poznan PRZEGLAD WOJSK LOTNICZYCH I WOJSK
 OBRONY POWIETRZNEJ KRAJU in Polish No 5, May 93 pp
 39-44
 Subslug:   [Article by Col. Marian Kopczewski, Ph.D., of the Higher
 Officers School of Antiaircraft Defense, on the political
 conditionings of a military threat to the Republic of
 Poland: "Directions of Change in the Air Defense of
 Central European Countries Following the Transformation of
 Their Systems of Society"]
 FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:
 1.  [Article by Col. Marian Kopczewski, Ph.D., of the Higher Officers
 School of Antiaircraft Defense, on the political conditionings of a
 military threat to the Republic of Poland: "Directions of Change in
 the Air Defense of Central European Countries Following the
 Transformation of Their Systems of Society"]
 2.  [Text] Any form of combat activity, including air defense, is
 continually in a flux owing to the ongoing development of operational
 art and tactics, the means of air attack by a potential enemy, and
 the views on their use. The role and importance of air defense in any
 European country hinge on its geographical location and strategic
 factors. Poland's position in the center of Europe at a boundary
 between the zones of political and economic interests of various
 countries impels us to be on the alert to military threats ensuing
 from particular political conditions. The current isolation of the
 countries of Central Europe following the change in their systems of
 society and the relatively unpredictable unfolding of events in the
 eastern countries necessitate watching out for a variety of military
 threats linked to evaluating possible occurrences in Europe.
 3.  A detailed analysis of the factors conditioning the existence of
 a military threat to Poland requires considering the situation of all
 Approved for Release
 UNCLASSIFIED        --La
 Q.1
 C00174671
 Page: 2     of 27
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1993
 Document 2 of 19                                                Page   2
 of its neighbor countries and grouping them by the scale of eventual
 threat as follows:
 4.  1. Countries that at present are no threat to us at all or only
 minimally: Denmark, Sweden, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and
 Slovakia.
 5.  2. Countries that are a greater threat to us and that emerged
 from the former USSR. The situation in that region is still far from
 stable.
 6.  3. Germany-there the threat consists of our economic and
 technological backwardness. As for the military threat, given the
 current international situation, it is hardly likely, but, in view of
 the huge military and economic potential of Germany, it has to be
 taken into account.
 7.  Thus, the political, and hence also the.military, situation in
 Central Europe is exceptionally complex, and it may grow worse in the
 years to come. In extremal situations and the absence of successful
 political actions (a collective security system), Poland and,
 indirectly, other countries of Central Europe may find themselves in
 a kind of political encirclement (or isolation), leading to military
 consequences.
 9.  An assessment of the dangers to Poland and other countries of
 Central Europe prompts the conclusion that the traditional concept of
 massed air attacks against the territory of the former Warsaw Pact
 that might be carried out by the NATO air force is no longer a viable
 basis for planning air defense. Previously, the political and
 military conditions in Europe had been the principal cause of a
 widespread fear of a surprise air strike by the potential enemy. That
 fear or psychosis persisted even during periods of declared detente.
 Any unidentified flying object used to be interpreted by people as
 the beginning of World War III. Air-defense systems were often placed
 on alert status not by the potential enemy but by an accident, and
 such errors bore tragic consequences. For example, on 1 September
 1983, Soviet air-defense fighters shot down a Boeing 747 over
 Kamchatka. Several months afterward, an Iranian A-300 passenger plane
 was brought down by a missile launched from a United States warship.
 On 28 May 1987, Mathias Rust's flight in a sports plane triggered
 Soviet air defense into a state of combat readiness. The event of
 1989 was the overflight of a MiG-23 past half of Europe after its
 pilot left it by parachute owing to a breakdown.
 10.  Protection against the effects of various errors necessitates
 000174671
 Page: 3     of 27
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1993
 Document 2 of 19                                                Page   3
 exploring in peacetime ever better means, methods, and forms of
 military monitoring of the airspace in the context of its
 demilitarization. What, then, is the threat from the air nowadays?
 11.  Polish airspace (by the will of the government) is being
 utilized by quite a few users for a variety of purposes, on employing
 aircraft of varying design and possibilities. In general, both
 civilian and military objects, Polish and foreign, may be present in
 that airspace. Their number varies greatly, depending on the time of
 day and the season of the year. At present, some 200 aircraft overfly
 Polish territory daily (and about 2,000 overfly German territory).
 All airspace users are obliged to strictly heed the air traffic
 rules, and their compliance is monitored by an appropriate control
 system. It is a fact that, in Poland, that system displays certain
 defects so that users of our airspace may cause accidental or
 purposeful (terrorist) threats.
 12.  Those airspace characteristics are the basis for evaluating
 possible dangers from the air over Polish territory in peacetime and,
 hence, also serve to reach conclusions concerning the nature of our
 air defense:
 13.  -It must be continually ready to monitor the entire Polish
 __ ___ a rspace. __
 14.  -It should act as a deterrent to any potential airspace
 violator.
 15.  -It should operate with weapons of considerable firepower and
 veil-trained crews capable of responding to the danger of terrorist
 attacks.
 16.  A requirement for the solidity of the country's defense system
 is its ability to deter threats in times of eventual conflict. Until
 such time that we gain new allies linked to us by treaties of mutual
 military assistance, threats to Poland from the air should be viewed
 as a combination of factors, any of which may be likely.
 17.  The Eastern Direction. The air forces of the former USSR may be
 a major danger to us in view of their considerable numerical
 superiority and the availability to them of thorough information
 about the infrastructure and basing of our units. The aircraft units
 based in the western military districts adjoining our eastern
 boundaries and the Baltic Fleet together total about 1,500 aircraft.
 They may be flown in from various directions, and the principal air
 strike targets in our country would be: elements of the Polish
 air-defense system, the main groupings of troops, administrative and
 economic centers, and the transportation infrastructure east of the
 000174671
 Page: 4     of 27
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1993
 Document 2 of 19                                                 Page   4
 18.  The Western Direction. The German Air Force consists of 630
 aircraft. Their current basing 50-100 km in the interior (plus
 monitoring and guidance elements 10-20 km in the interior) makes
 possible the execution of surprise attacks from two directions: the
 sea and Berlin.
 19. An assessment of the dangers in the event of a conflict prompts
 the following conclusions:
 20.  -In peacetime, financial and organizational actions should be
 focused on building strong air-defense systems in regions of special
 danger (the Pomeranian Military District an the coastal air-defense
 zone).
 21.  -The military districts that include regions directly threatened
 in the event of a conflict should operate with strong and
 maneuverable air-defense units.
 22.  -Troop air defense should be chiefly in the nature of direct air
 defense.
 23.  Directions of Change in Air Defense; Aspects of the Polish Air
 Defense MOdCT                                                      -
 24.  Until recently, the air-defense systems of the countries of
 Central Europe were an integral component of the air-defense system
 of the Warsaw Pact. That meant that priority was given to the aims
 and tasks of the Warsaw Pact over the tasks of protecting the
 national territory.  Such a hierarchy of the aims and tasks of air
 defense was not conducive to the formulation of a sovereign military
 policy by the individual member countries. The air-defense system of
 the Warsaw Pact countries represented clearly defined elements of the
 overall aims and organizational structure of the coalition system.
 Poland, by virtue of its geographical position, served to protect the
 northern wing of the coalition and focused the efforts of its own
 air-defense system on the Baltic seacoast, upon committing
 considerable investment outlays for that purpose.  Similar tasks and
 priorities obliged the other member countries of the coalition. But,
 however objectionable that situation may have been, it would be a
 mistake to overlook the fact that the division of effort within the
 coalition rationalized the outlays on air defense of Poland, the
 former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria and was conducive to
 mutual security.
 25.  That situation changed radically with the dissolution of the
 Warsaw Pact. What used to be good as part of the coalition whole
 C00174671
 Page: 5     of 27
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1993
 Document 2 of 19                                                Page   5
 proved to be weak and ill-organized for every former member country
 now on its own. The maladjustment of the air-defense systems of the
 countries of Central Europe to the new conditions is also due to
 their loss of their big-power protector, the USSR, especially as
 regards antimissile and antispace defense.
 26.  The countries of Central Europe are facing the problem of
 radically changing the organizational structure of their own national
 air-defense systems. Hence, what kind of changes, and what should
 their nature be? And can those countries at present afford to
 introduce them? I believe that the nature of the changes in the
 air-defense systems of those countries can be grasped by means of a
 long-range view of the role and place of their airspaces, which will
 develop as part of the new relations between the Commonwealth of
 Independent States, especially Russia, and a united Western Europe.
 To both of those parties, the airspaces of Poland, the Czech
 Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary constitute a genuine buffer zone that
 can equally well promote mutual security and threats.
 27.  It appears that Western Europe and Russia will, in that respect,
 make decisions advantageous to themselves first of all. Therefore,
 even now it is highly important to the countries of Central Europe
 whether the European countries accept a strong air defense of the
 -above-mentioned buffer zone-strong enough to oppose the utilization
 of its airspace as a transit zone for an air strike or to respoird
 that strike-or whether it would be better for them for the air
 defense of that region to be weak, weak enough to permit the
 arbitrary utilization of airspace by anyone at will. Consider that by,
 assumption that airspace seems ideally designed as a locale for an
 eventual gigantic air battle outside the territory of the countries
 engaging in that battle. Only time will answer that and other similar
 questions.
 28.  The experience at the end of this century shows that a strong
 and well-organized air defense is needed in the present-day world.
 Only such a defense can assure the proper existence of countries and
 serve to engage in offensive and defensive operations on land, on
 sea, and in the air. The role of the Polish air-defense system ensues
 from.its geographic location and strategic conditions of military
 alignment. It can be thus stated that the role of air defense in the
 nation's defense system is determined by: the extent of danger from
 the air, the possibility of eliminating or reducing that danger, and
 the views on the means of eliminating or reducing that danger.
 Allowing for those determining factors, modern air defense should be
 characterized by:
 29.  -Combating enemy air strength from all threatened directions
 throughout the altitude range.
 C00174671
 Page: 6     of 27
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1993
 Document 2 of 19                                                Page   6
 30.  -Concentrating the air-defense effort in the principal regions
 and directions of the threat.
 31.  -Continuously responding to enemy attacks over the entire
 national territory and far beyond its boundaries.
 32.  -Highly effectively destroying the enemy's air strength at
 various altitudes and air speeds.
 33.  -Combating the enemy's air strength in the presence of
 considerable radio-electronic noise.
 34.  -Flexibly operating the forces and resources of the air-defense
 system.
 35.  Considering the political and military situation in Europe and
 the role and requirements of the air-defense system, its
 restructuring in the countries of Central Europe is a necessity that
 brooks no delay. In view of its geopolitical position in Europe,
 Poland should show initiative in developing a model air-defense
 system of its own. That initiative in abandoning whatever is outworn
 and unsuited to the formation of a European security system could
 -protidean_example_._to other countries. Its announcement could be yet
 another stage in making credie the goats of the mlitary policy of----
 Poland, which wants to build its own armed forces, with the object of
 maintaining a state of armed neutrality.
 36.  A broad analysis of European political-military, operational,
 and economic conditions warrants considering a gradual "civilian
 conversion" of that part of the air-defense system that accomplishes
 its objectives in peacetime. Taking that initiative requires
 organizing and maintaining two institutionally separate air-defense
 systems: the peacetime and the wartime ones.
 37.  Such an organizationally dual air-defense system should cope
 with the following requirements:
 38.  -It should assure in peacetime effective monitoring and control
 of Polish airspace and act as a deterrent to eventual airspace
 violators (oppose acts of air terror).
 39.  -It should retain combat readiness to oppose an air threat in
 the event of armed aggression against Poland.
 40.  The peacetime air-defense system should be prepared to
 accomplish the following objectives:
 000174671
 Page: 7     of 27
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1993
 Document 2 of 19                                                 Page   7
 41.  -Alerting and keeping posted the government and the military
 about air activity in neighboring countries and any eventual actions
 taken in the vicinity of our borders.
 42.  -Assuring air security (with the object of protecting the
 integrity of the airspace) by responding to any overflight that
 constitutes a threat-that is, to any unidentified overflight or one
 not following the accepted rules.
 43.  -Controlling air traffic, chiefly to ensure adherence to rules
 and standards, and coordinating military air traffic with civilian
 air traffic and experimental flights.
 44.  -Conducting search-and-rescue operations, inclusive of the
 organization of operational cooperation among teams searching for
 lost aircraft and rescue teams.
 45.  The postulated scope of the peacetime objectives of air defense
 requires radical organizational changes. In that context, the Border
 Guards should be responsible for the air protection of borders, in
 partnership with civilian monitoring and control of air traffic and
 civilian communications and supply systems. That would be the first
 measure to break with the practice of "standing on guard of national
 __ ___so_vereignty_wih fully, ready armed forces," ' a practice that should
 be regarded as a cold war relic.
 46.  Periods of intensive change are always characterized by
 considerable uncertainty about the future. That is so now, too; we
 can consider many probable scenarios of the future geopolitical
 situation in Europe, but we cannot predict which one will prove true.
 On the one-to be sure, realistic-extreme, there is the possibility of
 the formation of a European security system in the short run, while,
 on the other, there may arise the danger of Poland's becoming
 isolated from the European Community and facing a growing military
 threat.
 47.  In view of that, our fundamental strategic objectives should be,
 first, the creation of sufficient defensive strength to discourage
 potential aggressors from attempting to use armed force in order to
 exert pressure or perpetrate aggression, and, second, in the event of
 aggression, to repulse the enemy's strikes and, in the event of its
 invasion of our national territory, to destroy its forces or push
 them back beyond our borders.
 48.  Thus, the need to start work on adapting the Polish air-defense
 system to the new political, economic, and defense conditions arising
 in our country and in the neighboring countries is justified. Those
 conditions require an innovative definition of the role and place of
 C00174671
 Page: 8     of 27
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1993
 Document 2 of 19                                                 Page   8
 air defense in the Polish system of national defense and, partially,
 also in the European military system. As a consequence, the
 organizational and operating requirements for a Polish air-defense
 system have to be adapted to future needs by developing and testing
 different models of that system.
 49.  The present-day Polish air-defense system includes a broad
 variety of specialized means of counteracting potential air strikes.
 The jurisdiction over those means varies.  Generally speaking, the
 objectives of broadly interpreted air defense are being accomplished:
 by the Air Force and the Air Defense Troops, which have been merged
 into a single branch of armed forces; the antiaircraft troops, as a
 branch of operational service; radio-electronic warfare units and
 subunits, and the antiaircraft units of the Navy.  That
 organizational fragmentation is counterproductive. Too many
 decisionmakers, using the same kind of resources, want to do the same
 thing in Polish airspace.  The current Polish air-defense system is
 adapted to accomplishing Warsaw Pact objectives rather than those of
 a conceptual model of Polish national air defense.
 51.  To sum up the reflections on a conceptual model of the Polish
 air__defense syst m,__it_can be stated that:  -                         ---   -
 52.  -The nature of that system is determined by the magnitude of its
 combat potential, the manner in which it is used, and the nature of
 the threat.
 53.  -The magnitude of combat potential should ensue from the needs
 (requirements) for counteracting the air threat.
 54.  -The operating procedures and organizational structure
 (including division of labor) should be optimized in the interest of
 the Polish air-defense system as a whole rather than of its selected
 elements (such as the Antiaircraft Defense Troops, the Air Force and
 Air Defense Troops, and others).
 55.  -Air defense should be extended to the entire Polish territory,
 along with all objects present thereon, on varying the pattern of
 deployment of the combat resources, depending on the degree of threat
 and the importance of objects.
 56.  -Given the proposed model of the Polish air-defense system,
 allowance should be made for two basic categories: zonal air defense
 and direct air defense. That differentiation is required by the
 differences in the threat posed to air defense by different kinds of
 airborne means of attack. In accordance with that division, the
 UNCLASSIFIED
 C00174671
 Page: 9     of 27
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1993
 Document 2 of 19                                                 Page   9
 Polish air-defense system should be divided into two separate but
 mutually complementary parts: a national air-defense system in charge
 of zonal air defense and a military air-defense system in charge of
 operational direct air defense for the purposes of troop support.
 57.  -The organizational structures of air defense themselves should
 be simplified, especially as regards the chain of command, which
 should be reduced to a minimum (while at the same time assuring a
 sufficient variety of equipment for each structure).
 58.  -The basic elements of direct air defense should be the
 reconnaissance-command-fire team (artillery battalion, battery). That
 kind of defense should be, like antitank defense, propagated
 throughout the military.
 59.  -Air defense in all of its aspects should be subordinated to the
 overall national defense system, which in practical terms will mean
 that the territorial division of zonal air defense would correspond
 to the design of organizational structures and the scopes of
 competence.
 60.  -In peacetime, a part of the resources of Polish air defense
 should be used to monitor the airspace and as a deterrent. Allowing
 -for-the-requirementsAt_modern_air defense and the directions of its
 development, it can be argued that the rode o  a3 r ~eferise will
 steadily grow, and its effectiveness will be a fundamental criterion
 for evaluating the defensive capability of a country or a coalition
 of countries.

