 C00174753
 Page: 1     of 26
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1990
 Document 2 of 8                                                  Page   1
 Classification:   UNCLASSIFIED       Status:        [STAT]
 Document Date:    01 Aug 90          Category:      [CAT]
 Report Type:      JPRS Report        Report Date:
 Report Number:    JPRS-USP-90-005    UDC Number:
 Headline:  Leonov Interviewed on Soviet Manned Lunar Program, Current
 Issues
 Source Line:  90700151 Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No
 8, Aug 90 pp 44-45
 Subslug:   [Interview with Maj. Gen. Avn. Aleksey Arkhipovich Leonov,
 USSR Pilot-Cosmonaut, twice Hero of the Soviet Union: "The
 Flight That Didn't Take Place: Maj.  Gen. Avn. A. Leonov,
 USSR Pilot-Cosmonaut and Twice Hero of the Soviet Union,
 Talks About the Soviet Lunar Program and Current Problems
 of the Space Program"; the remarks of interviewer Maj. I.
 Kuznetsov appear in bold]
 FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:
 1.   [Interview with Maj. Gen. Avn. Aleksey Arkhipovich Leonov, USSR
 Pilot-Cosmonaut, twice Hero of the Soviet Union: "The Flight That
 Didn't Take Place: Maj.  Gen. Avn. A. Leonov, USSR Pilot-Cosmonaut
 and Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Talks About the Soviet Lunar
 Program and Current Problems of the Space Program" ; the remarks of
 interviewer Maj. I. Kuznetsov appear in bold]
 2.  [Text] Aleksey Arkhipovich, the readers of our journal are
 interested in the "blank spaces" in the history of the Soviet space
 program. One of them is our manned lunar program, in which you had
 the occasion to be a participant. Please share your recollections
 with us.
 3.  The Soviet manned lunar program called for two phases: first, a
 flight around the moon and, second, the landing of a man on the moon.
 The technical diredtor of the program was Hero of Socialist Labor
 Vasiliy Pavlovich Mishin.
 4.  The first phase, in the mid-1960s--which is when the specialists
 at the Center actually became involved in the project--was seen as a
 reality: the Proton launch vehicle had already flown, and the Soyuz
 vehicle, which had received the designation L-1 in its lunar
 modification, was taking shape in metal. The second phase, however,
 was problematical. Still, we believed that it would come off. Sergey
 Pavlovich Korolev, even before the decision  as made to implement the
 lunar program, had told us of the powerful r-1 booster and the L-3
 vehicle, whose development his team was wor'cing on. At the time, we
 thought that the lunar program was designed to span many years. Plans
 49.
 UNCLASSIFIED       Approved for Release
 Q 6
 C00174753
 Page: 2     of 26
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1990
 Document 2 of 8                                                  Page   2
 for the creation of lunar settlements and for flights to the planets
 of the solar system were being debated. There was all of that; but
 reality demonstrated that our dreams were getting far ahead of
 workable events.
 5. The booster that was to be used to effect the program of
 circumlunar flight had been built and had proved itself admirably.
 However, the first launch of Zond--that's what the unmanned version
 of the L-1 was called--was unsuccessful. Why? In order to attain
 escape velocity, a boost module (the D module) had been installed on
 the Proton, but the command switching was mixed up, and instead of an
 acceleration we got a deceleration. The vehicle had to be destroyed.
 This was the first danger signal. The next launch went well, but then
 there was another malfunction in the booster. After working for
 several seconds, it dropped a short distance from the launch site. It
 turned out that a rubber plug had gotten into the manifold just ahead
 of the turbopump assembly.  Becoming stuck in a duct in the pump, it
 cut off the fuel supply. After that, major malfunctions resulting in
 aborted flights occurred every other flight.
 6.  In 1968, it became clear that we wouldn't accomplish the task
 before the Americans did. One reason was the lack of proper financing
 and the improper allocation of funds.
 7.  You said that the main efforts were devoted to implementation of
 the L-1 program? How were the cosmonauts trained for that?
 8.  In all, nearly 20 people were training for the lunar program. The
 first crevs--Leonov and Makarov, Bykovskiy and Rukavishnikov--were
 formed from among them. The entire group, believing that the goals
 that were set were achievable, worked diligently, for each one
 thought that, if the circumlunar flight were successful, he would
 automatically move on to the next phase with the L-3. Therefore, the
 training looked toward the future.  We mastered many simulators,
 including a dynamic simulator that was built from a helicopter, and
 went through the test-pilot course at the Flight Research Institute.
 Realizing that the most difficult task would be the landing on the
 Moon, we learned how to quickly pick out an area and set down the
 craft with limited fuel reserves and how to instantly estimate
 vertical velocity.
 9.  Upon returning from the Moon, the landing approach was supposed
 to be from the direction of Antarctica. In order to learn the
 constellations in the vicinity of the Southern Cross well, we even
 flew to Somalia. For independent navigation, the vehicle was
 outfitted with an astrotracker and sextant, and the cosmonauts
 devoted much time to the study of those instruments. In the final
 analysis, everyone learned to work with a complete understanding of
 C00174753
 Page: 3     of 26
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1990
 Document 2 of 8                                                  Page   3
 the dynamics of circumlunar flight.
 10.  To perfect the landing on Earth from escape velocity, the
 specialists developed a clearcut, detailed procedure with two
 immersions. We had to learn how to use the astrotracker and sextant
 to select the angle of entry after the final correction. And the
 proper angle depends on the magnitude and direction of the
 retrothrust impulse. If the angle is too large, the vehicle may "dig
 into- the atmosphere; if it's too small, the vehicle can
 "overshoot" the atmosphere. The best version is an entry with a
 "skip": you enter the atmosphere, exit it, and, after losing high
 velocity, enter again, all the while keeping in mind which angle of
 attack the vehicle must maintain to reach the designated touchdown
 point. The "Manual Impulse Entry" instrument flashed the number of
 impulses after covering the first segment. We also used it to figure
 out the distance to the designated touchdown point. The distance was
 then converted into an angle of attack. All those operations were
 perfected in the dynamic " Volchok" simulator. In the end, we
 learned to make a "landing" with a precision of within a kilometer.
 After passing examinations on the design of the vehicle and the
 flight program, the cosmonauts were ready for circumlunar flight.
 11.  The flight would be difficult, even in terms of just the living
 arrangements, because, unlike Soyuz, the L-1 did not have an orbital
 module, and two people would have to spend a week in the descent
 module. We had high hopes as we watched the last unmanned flight.
 But, when the nose shield was jettisoned, a command was also sent to
 jettison the parachute system. The ship hit the ground and was
 flattened. Curiously, some of the film that it was bringing back was
 intact. As a result, we were the first to get beautiful, extremely
 clear photographs of Earth from the Moon.
 12.  In December 1968, the Americans performed a circumlunar flight
 with Apollo 8, and our leaders were shaken: "Do we need to do it
 now? General Designer Mishin nonetheless managed to perform one more
 test flight of the unmanned version. And again a failure. Problems
 with the flight configuration led to depressurization of the craft. I
 should add that all three launches of the N-1 booster rocket in the
 flight-design testing were unsuccessful.  Soberly sizing up the
 situation, the government shut down the program for landing a man on
 the Moon.
 13.  Aleksey Arkhipovich, was our plan any different from that of the
 Americans?
 14.  Our lunar lander was similar to the American lander, and the
 flight plans, as envisioned even by Kondratyuk, were in no way
 different from theirs. The craft had to attain a circumlunar
 C00174753
 Page: 4     of 26
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1990
 Document 2 of 8                                                 Page   4
 reference orbit, and a capsule would separate from it and make a soft
 landing on the Moon.  It's true, though, that unlike the American
 plan, ours involved landing just one person. But the operations on
 the Moon and the return to Earth were exactly the same.
 15.  I remember that the Soviet Union was conducting investigations
 of the Moon with unmanned satellites at the same time. They provided
 us with interesting information that was even more complete than what
 the Americans had at the time. But there was one other difference.
 16.  The accident aboard Apollo 13, involving an explosion of a fuel
 element, demonstrated the very flexible thinking of the American
 leaders. Having been honest in giving out all the details, they were
 able to rally the entire nation at the time. Literally all of America
 was watching that mission, living through it, thinking about how to
 rescue the crew and making suggestions. But we always hushed up our
 emergency situations, trying to show the superiority of Soviet
 engineering. In actual fact, we had many more emergencies than did
 the Americans. But that wasn't told to the people. Therefore, many
 got the impression that the development of outer space was a rather
 simple affair, and that the upkeep for the cosmonauts was costing the
 government a lot and was economically unjustified.
 17.  How did you follow the execution of the Apollo program by the
 Americans?
 18.  The entire world, except for the Soviet Union and China, watched
 the first step of man onto the Moon. But none of the Soviet people,
 except for at most a hundred people watching the news reports in one
 of the organizations, saw the launch of the craft, its landing on the
 Moon, or the activities of the crew. History has rightly judged our
 ideologues, Ponomarev and Suslov, and the course with which they
 guided the country. But the Americans have no false morality. In
 1965, they gratefully accepted all our information on the walk in
 space and coordinated their own program with it. If at first they had
 planned to have an astronaut just stick his arm out of the craft, now
 they duplicated my space walk and even used a hand-held space gun
 that enabled the astronaut control his body somewhat in space.
 Returning to the American lunar program, let me say that there are no
 "blank spots" in it for me. Moreover, I have the flights of Apollo
 10 through 17 saved on video cassette.
 19.  And have you seen any extraterrestrials in your films? The UFO
 watchers claim that the first men on the Moon saw them, and that
 extraterrestrials were watching the astronauts. Is this true?
 20.  Those who are prone to every kind of sensationalism have taken a
 phrase in the astronauts' conversation out of context and are
 000174753
 Page: 5     of 26
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1990
 Document 2 of 8                                                 Page   5
 building their fantasies on it. After the landing on the Moon, clear
 communications were set up with the flight control center in Houston.
 A picture was sent to the Moon and back. Neal Armstrong, exiting from
 the ship, stepped onto the surface very carefully, and then he grew
 bolder, and his steps became more confident, and he began to jump.
 I've seen those frames.  James Aldrin, turning to him, said, "Look
 out, they're watching us." "They" in the sense of "Earth." Then
 he advised Armstrong not to violate the instructions and to be more
 careful. And in fact, after that, Neal Armstrong began to walk with
 normal steps. I have told the UFO watchers repeatedly, "Why are you
 speculating about this? It's not at all what you think."
 21.  We have created the reusable Buran, it has gone through the
 first tests, and now some--for example, Academician Sagdeyev--say
 that we don't need it. What is your opinion?
 22.  We have the Mir program. If we really want to collect dividends,
 we have to be able to bring back to Earth the materials involved in
 the research that is carried out.  The Soyuz craft can return a small
 volume of cargo that weighs a maximum of 100-120 kg. We are planning
 to return tons. Only Buran can do that. In light of that, I can't
 agree with Sagdeyev when he says that there's nothing for Buran to do
 in orbit. We need it as a component part of the transport system of
 the Mir program. Sagdeyev is not right here.
 23.  On top of that, he was silent before now, and now he is raising
 objections. It would be more ethical on his part to be giving an
 accounting for his own project: why did the Phobos vehicles, which he
 launched and in which large sums were invested, fail before reaching
 their target?
 24.  This, it seems, would be a good place to touch on the matter of
 improving the profitability of space?
 25.  The space program, being the embodiment of the leading
 scientific and engineering thinking, is indeed capable of a much
 larger economic return. The Americans, after spending $25 billion on
 the lunar program, subsequently made a profit twice that figure
 through the introduction of new technologies and developments. The
 situation is somewhat different with us. But whose fault is that? The
 space program's?
 26.  As far back as the '30s, Academician Kapitsa posed this question
 to the economic council of the Sovnarkom: What incentives for
 adoption of new inventions are built into the Soviet system? And he
 answered the question himself: "I see none." The situation has not
 changed since that time. What projects have the economists not
 justified to please the politicians-- " depeasantization," the
 C00174753
 Page: 6     of 26
 Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1990
 Document 2 of 8                                                  Page   6
 "elimination of unpromising villages," the "redirecting of the
 courses of the northern rivers," and other pitifuly memorable
 projects. And to this day, there is no economic mechanism to
 encourage enterprises to adopt new products or technologies that, in
 abundance, lie unclaimed in the space sector, for example. That is
 where the talk of the poor profitability of space comes from.  But
 that's not the space program's fault--it's the space program's
 misfortune.
 27.  I remember how we were asked to monitor farm lands from space.
 In a matter of days, we produced a mountain of information; but it
 differed by 25-30 percent from the amount issued by Goskomstat [State
 Committee for Statistics]. And they refused our services. We
 explained that many of the fields are either smaller than indicated
 by the data of the Agroprom, or are not being used, and therefore
 were not included in the reckoning. The results of mismanagement are
 also very visible from space: pastures trampled down, rivers and
 ponds ruined, the air in cities polluted. We can talk about all the
 outrages committed on Soviet soil, for example, by the Ministry of
 Land Reclamation and Water Resources. There's a lot of talk today
 about the Aral Sea and Lake Balkhash. And yet, the cosmonauts were
 the first to sound the alarm, 15 years ago. I myself vent to Pelsha,
 the chairman of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central
 Committee, and told him what was happening on the Baykal-Amur
 Railroad and at the Aral Sea.  Although certain decisions were made
 with regard to the Baykal-Amur Railroad, nothing has been done for
 the Aral.
 28.  It seems that no one has any use for our information. I
 personally feel that it is primarily the economists who should be
 reproached for that. And here the press should place the emphasis
 where it belongs. Good communications are needed, in both directions,
 and then there will be an economic impact.
 29.  And the last question, often asked by the readers of our
 journal: Do you think those of us living today will witness the
 realization of a Soviet lunar program?
 30.  No such program is envisaged before the year 2000.  After that,
 we shall see.

