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 Document 7 of 12                                                Page   1
 Classification:   UNCLASSIFIED       Status:         [STAT]
 Document Date:      23 Sep 90        Category:       [CAT]
 Report Type:      Daily Report       Report Date:
 Report Number:    FBIS-SOV-90-188    UDC Number:
 Author(s):   N. Garifullina, on 19 September; place not given: "A
 Choice Has To Be Made"--first two paragraphs are
 SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]
 Source Line:  PM2709094390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23
 Sep 90 Second Edition pp 1-2
 Subslug:   [Interview with Academician L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman
 of the USSR Council of Ministers, by N. Garifullina, on 19
 September; place not given: "A Choice Has To Be
 Made"--first two paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
 introduction]
 FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:
 1.  [Interview with Academician L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the
 USSR Council of Ministers, by N. Garifullina, on 19 September; place
 not given: "A Choice Has To Be Made"--first two paragraphs are
 SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]
 2.  [Text] The debate at the USSR Supreme Soviet on the transition to
 a market economy seems to have reached "boiling point." What
 decision will the people's deputies adopt, and which path will the
 country take?  Millions of people await the answer with anxiety and
 hope.
 3.  SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA recently familiarized readers with the
 Shatalin-Yavlinskiy program.  And today one of the authors of the
 government program--Academician L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the
 USSR Council of Ministers--shares his thoughts.  The conversation
 with him took place 19 September.
 4.  [Garifullina] Leonid Ivanovich, on addressing the USSR Supreme
 Soviet session, you made principled comments on the presidential
 program for the transition to a market economy.  You said at that
 time that this was not only your personal opinion--it was supported
 by members of the USSR Government.  Could you speak about this in
 greater detail?
 5.  [Abalkin] I was speaking not of details--there are very many of
 them--but of three fundamental, conceptual disagreements which cannot
 be eliminated by the method of reaching agreement. They demand a
 Approve for Release
 UNCLASSIFIED                A01 0
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 choice.  Here it is not a matter of seeking a compromise but of the
 need to make a political decision.
 6.  The first comment concerns the choice of the option for moving
 toward the market.  We all reached the conclusion--and I believe that
 this is proved convincingly by historical experience and
 science--that without the market it is impossible to extricate the
 country from the crisis and to create an efficient, flexible economy
 that is receptive to scientific and technical progress and geared to
 the consumer.  But the transition to the market certainly does not
 mean abandoning socialism.  On the contrary, it means impregnating
 socialism with new qualities and emancipating its
 potential--economic, social, and spiritual.  However, it is very
 difficult to combine the market with the model of socialism which has
 evolved in our country.
 7.  How are we to move toward the market?  The presidential program
 proposes an accelerated transition.  It is also called "shock
 therapy," but I do not think these are the right words.  An
 accelerated, speeded-up transition is more accurate.  But we believe
 that such an option is unacceptable for the country.  We favor the
 radical-moderate option, which combines decisive changes with
 caution, consideration, and strict calculation.  You can say as much
 as you like that we are too cautious, but this is not a character
 trait of those who drew it up but a position based on a sober
 analysis and prognosis.
 8.  What is at the basis of this approach?  The crisis in the economy
 is developing and deepening.  This is a reality. The structure of
 the economy has evolved over decades, it is cumbersome, with a huge
 proportion of extracting sectors and with monopolized production
 structures.  It is unrealistic to restructure everything in weeks and
 months or, maybe, even over several years.
 9.  Further, considerable sections of the population are not ready to
 work under the new conditions.  It is possible to speak about
 stereotypes of thinking and a backward mentality--but, once again,
 these are realities.  It is necessary also to take account of the
 political instability in society, the increased activities of certain
 forces, and the growth of national separatism.  All this leads to the
 conclusion that, if we go too hastily, disregarding the possible
 consequences, then this could not only result in a greater crisis in
 the economy but also discourage us from tackling the reform at some
 time in the very near future.
 10.  The next difference concerns the view of the fate of the Union.
 Yes, of course, the deformations which have accumulated in
 interethnic relations over the decades and the infringement of the
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 rights of nations, ethnic groups, republics, and regions are
 realities which have been perpetrated, but it is necessary to
 overcome them and preserve the union state.  It is a subject in
 international law, a great power, a permanent member of the UN
 Security Council, a power which has signed many postwar agreements.
 And, accordingly, it is a state which must possess all the necessary
 attributes in the economic sphere too, have a unified border, a
 unified custom house and territory, and a unified monetary system,
 and have at its disposal the USSR Central State Bank fulfilling
 functions approximating to those fulfilled in similar states by the
 federal reserve, system, as in the United States, or by the Deutsche
 Bundesbank in the FRG.  Accordingly, not only does each republic
 possess sovereignty but the USSR also has its own' sovereignty as a
 state.  Yes, the powers and the borders of sovereignty are determined
 by treaty, but this is all to come and does not yet exist, and we are
 accustoming ourselves to living in a rule-of-law state and we respect
 and observe the laws.  The constitutional norms of the Union extend
 throughout the territory. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
 Republic Supreme Soviet has adopted a concept and a program which
 essentially proceeds from recognition of the elimination of the USSR
 as a state.  This Union is also supplanted by a union, but an
 economic one, by some international agreement which is said even to
 be close to the EC. It is possible to find a more accurate
 definition--the British Commonwealth of Nations, for example, or
 maybe an even more accurate one: the old CEMA with all its flaws.
 11.  As regards the new Union Treaty, in my view subsequent political
 agreements will merely make the economic union official, and the
 state's disintegration will be a fait accompli.  And it is proposed
 to do this without broad discussion, in secret....
 12.  (Garifullina] Maybe this is why there is such haste?...
 13.  [Abalkin] The haste is understandable too. The thing is that at
 first the -500 days" program contained a kind of mystery effect.
 You understand, they suggest to people: There is some miraculous
 means, and our people believe in miracles or, at least, they want to
 believe that there is a painless path, without sacrifices and
 upheavals, without a drop in living standards, without a rise in
 prices....
 14.  You might have noticed that in such crisis situations there
 begins a mass belief in aliens, UFO's, extrasensory perception, and
 much else.  This is a social phenomenon, you know.  I spoke of this
 many years ago.  This situation began to be manifested clearly in the
 late seventies and early eighties.  Way back then I used to appear
 and say how social collisions give rise to such a belief.  And so the
 11500 days" program also contained a kind of mystery effect.  No one
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 had yet seen it, but the idea of its miracle-working properties was
 being purposefully and systematically inculcated in the mass
 consciousness.
 15.  But when the program is placed on the table, when everyone can
 read it, perceive some contradictions and shortcomings, or, at any
 rate, take a conscious and critical approach to its calculations and
 authenticity, the mystery effect vanishes.  But the time which
 elapses before the decision is adopted is destructive.  And so people
 want to adopt the program as quickly as possible, without
 professional investigation and analysis, on trust alone. "Let's
 believe! Such names are there, such humane aims are proclaimed.
 Let's adopt it, and then we can see.  We will amend it, finish it
 off, correct it, elaborate it.  Why bother with trifles now?l..."
 16.  [Garifullina] And, at the same time, begin introducing this
 program super-promptly, as early as 1 October?...
 17.  [Abalkin] There is another nuance here. Yes, time is altogether
 getting short. The government program is also short of time, and we
 must not delay for long.  The first of October marks the start of the
 fourth quarter--we too emphasize this in our programs.  Only there
 this date is a zero option--there has been no history, and nothing at
 all has happened before 1 October.  And yet there is history.  The
 reform is already under way.  The laws on ownership, land, and
 leasing have already been adopted, the tax system has been adopted,
 and the Law on the Population's Income Tax has been in effect since 1
 July.
 18.  [Garifullina] Was all this the preparation?
 19.  [Abalkin] Yes, the preparation, but also the introduction of the
 reform.  The resolution on joint-stock companies was adopted so as
 not to wait for any further legislative acts.  The first companies
 have already been registered.  Commercial banks, which are the second
 level of the banking system--there are already approximately 300 of
 them--are preparing the ground.  The first trade exchanges have
 already been set up and are beginning to function.  Life is on the
 move!  The cooperative movement is developing too.
 20.  [Garifullina] That is, preparations were being made during all
 the years of perestroyka to introduce the program and make the
 transition to the market?
 21.  [Abalkin] Not all the years. I must be fair and admit that there
 was tardiness in implementing the economic reform and failures to
 meet deadlines, and it was introduced uncomprehensively.  This
 happened particularly during 1987-1989--after the well-known
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 decisions at the beginning of the reform.  But if we speak of the new
 government, which has been working for just over one year, this work
 really has been carried out consistently throughout the year.  And
 particularly intensively over the past eight months, since December,
 since the decisions of the Second Congress of People's Deputies which
 supported the measures proposed by the government and gave
 instructions to prepare the program.
 22.  Incidentally, it is important to point out that very frequently
 even respected people, highly respected people's deputies speak of
 the responsibility and the mistakes of the government over five
 years.  But the government has been operating for just one year, just
 like all the new structures of power, starting with the Congress of
 People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, which were elected only in
 March last year and began work in May.  So it is incorrect and
 unforgivable--I repeat--for quite professional and competent people
 to muddle dates or to do this deliberately.
 23.  But you were right to remark that the preparation was made
 consistently and that the whole system certainly did not start from
 scratch.  The laws which I mentioned have been adopted, and a new
 package of documents has been prepared and was submitted in August
 for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet.  All this boils down to
 very responsibly taking a big radical step.
 24.  The weakness of uncoordinated actions has already been proved by
 our experience.  This is inadmissible, and therefore many laws have
 already been adopted and normative acts are being prepared.  I will
 begin with a simple matter.  We have already adopted a decision to
 introduce new purchase prices.  Peasants await new prices for milk,
 meat, cotton, sugar beets, sunflowers-- the plan is built on them.
 This is a powerful incentive for any forms--peasant farms, collective
 farms, state farms--to begin functioning efficiently.  For the price
 is, above all, an incentive for producers.  If we introduce the
 pension law 1 January, we must have its financial base--new
 deductions for social insurance.  The third thing is deductions from
 social insurance, and the pension law.  If we introduce a new system
 of taxes on profits--we seem to have all agreed on this, and the law
 comes into force 1 January--it proposes a package for changing the
 system of prices.  Without them it is impossible to introduce either
 taxes or'new interest rates on bank credits, which, incidentally, are
 included in all the programs.  They are all bound up, and you cannot
 tear them apart. So it is unacceptable to try to tear up and
 dismember only a part of these measures, so as to cast doubt on the
 reality of social programs, of major financial and material support
 for the countryside and the agro-industrial sector by means of prices
 and special targeted investments of funds in the social restructuring
 of the countryside--the provision of gas supplies, road construction,
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 the guaranteed supply of material and technical resources.      It is
 hardly admissible to improve the economy at such a price.  That is,
 this is either the consistent, logical implementation of the steps
 which have been begun or an attempt to cancel out everything that has
 been done and to begin afresh, having torn up these measures at the
 time of their introduction.
 25.  [Garifullina] How do you assess the reality of financial
 improvement in the alternative programs?
 26.  [Abalkin] I can state with absolute accuracy, on the basis of an
 analysis of the proffered materials, that the measures in the program
 under discussion for financial improvement over a short period--100
 days--are unrealistic.  They are not confirmed by calculations and
 cannot be implemented without an offensive upon the living standards
 of broad sections of the population and upon social programs.  And if
 they are unrealistic, the guarantees which could restrain the sharp,
 rapid growth in prices that have been set free fall away.  This means
 that it is quite likely that the inflation spiral will unwind and we
 will lose the advantages which improvement could produce.
 27.  Here, just as in the second point on the future structure of the
 USSR, it is necessary to choose.  The way we see it and they--these
 approaches--are incompatible.
 28.  And society must make the choice.  Precisely society. But the
 choice cannot and must not go through in some offices, without the
 people.  We must determine which option we choose.  I see how complex
 and responsible the task facing the Supreme Soviet is....  And yet I
 emphasize once again that it is a question of a choice, and this is
 not just a comparison of two alternative options.  The choice of
 program is both a choice of destiny and an assumption of
 responsibility.  Someone must answer for any option.  Whoever
 submitted the program, voted for it, and assumed responsibility for
 its fulfillment must also answer before history, before the people's
 judgment.
 29.  If we speak of the government, it is prepared to answer only for
 the program which it elaborated and which it submitted repeatedly for
 discussion.  It has been discussed three times in the Presidential
 Council and the Council of the Federation, in addition to the Supreme
 Soviet.  Of course, we can assume responsibility only under certain
 conditions, and we are ready to formulate them.
 30.  [Garifullina] What are these conditions?
 31.  [Abalkin] To be brief, they are strict observance of the adopted
 laws and the USSR Constitution.  Rejection of any actions which
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 violate the norms of life in a rule-of-law state.  Observance of
 these laws at all levels and the restoration of law and order.
 Rejection of all destructive actions which represent nothing but
 playing with the people's destinies.  Rejection of economic blockades
 of territories and mass strikes, for which the country's population
 has to pay all the same, and the opening of enterprises of priority
 importance for the national economy connected with the production of
 medicinal preparations and many other products.  The declaration, if
 you like, of civilian peace and the conclusion of voluntary concord.
 32.  We are on the edge of an abyss.  Any incautious step could
 topple us into it.  We must appeal to the people's reason, to their
 consciousness--without this it is impossible to work.  This is an
 appeal not only to the republics.  It is an appeal to public
 movements and mass public actions.  It is also an appeal to such a
 very mighty fourth element of power--the press and the mass media,
 which shape public opinion in the country.  We must unite and
 understand what awaits the people.  And not try to place personal,
 political, or scientific ambitions above the people's interests.
 33.  [Garifullina] Leonid Ivanovich, what key, fundamental
 differences are there between the programs in their approaches to
 privatization and the easing of state control?
 34.  [Abalkin] The most fundamental difference in this sphere
 concerns land. We are opposed to the sale of land and its transfer to
 private ownership.  We recognize different forms: freedom of
 management and freedom to choose any forms of management. Peasants,
 rural workers, and city dwellers who want to use land will decide for
 themselves.  Provision can be made for long-term leasing, leasing for
 an unlimited term, and the bequeathing of leased land, if ecological
 and other requirements are not violated in its use.  The sale of land
 into private ownership contradicts the very logic of economic
 development.  Incidentally, many experts with whom we have spoken,
 even Western ones, have warned us of the dangerous consequences of
 selling land.  Yes, a person must feel confident and stable, and the
 bequeathing of land to children must be guaranteed, but the land is
 the common property of the people who inhabit the country, just as
 other natural resources are.
 35.  As for privatization....  Incidentally, this term is not quite
 accurate, and we do not use it.  Reduction of state control is a more
 accurate yet also a more complex concept.  I will cite the following
 example.  In my view, the president has accomplished an act of
 colossal political strength-- he has transferred to the ownership of
 the Academy of Sciences the property of institutes, laboratories, and
 scientific centers.  It has ceased to be state property and is now
 the property of the Academy of Sciences.  But is it really private
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 property if all the installations, laboratories, space centers--just
 what does it not include!--if all this is now at the disposal of the
 community of scientists? This is a totally different structure.
 There likewise exist multifarious forms of property of various
 types-- cooperative, collective, joint-stock, and certain others
 which are not covered by the concept "private property." It is
 admissible and is dictated by its own logic when it is a question of
 a hairdressing salon, a gasoline pump, a bakery, or something
 similar.  But, when reducing state control, it is necessary to ensure
 the primacy of labor collectives.  Precisely these must own the means
 of production and dispose of the results of their labor.  Both the
 master's mentality and high responsibility for the results of their
 labor will take shape precisely with the transfer of state property
 to them.
 36.  All forms must be combined and, when placed under equal
 conditions, by means of normal struggle and competition, prove their
 advantages and correspondingly occupy a greater or lesser proportion.
 I would say that there are no profound differences of principle here,
 because the question of exploitation has been removed both from the
 program submitted for discussion by the president and from ours.  I
 would like only to point out that reducing state control is a lengthy
 process.  A juridical change in the forms of ownership is an act of a
 moment, while a change in economic forms of relations requires
 considerably longer times.  It is dangerous to rush things.
 37.  [Garifullinaj Leonid Ivanovich, the program of the Union
 government is criticized primarily and chiefly for supposedly being
 based on a substantial rise in prices, and this has quite an impact
 on people who, on the whole, are not familiar with the program.  Do
 the alternative programs intend to avoid an increase in prices?
 38.  [Abalkinj When the programs are being compared, it is natural
 that the supporters of both programs try to emphasize the weak
 aspects or to accentuate attention on them.  I get the impression
 that this question is manifestly misrepresented and exaggerated. An
 attempt is being made to prove that all disagreements boil down only
 to this, and the myth that this is the chief difference is being
 stubbornly spread.
 39.  I am convinced that the creation of certain illusions is an
 attempt to evade the fundamental questions of which I spoke at the
 beginning--the fate of the Union, an accelerated transition, or a
 cautious, considered movement toward the market.  These questions
 take a back seat, as it were, and red rags are pulled out to tease
 public opinion.
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 instances--this is a law of the market, a law of economics.  If
 prices do not rise, speculation will increase, and no methods,
 including administrative measures, can beat speculation if such a
 system of price formation exists.  It is fertile ground for
 speculation.  Prices always gravitate toward their conventional,
 natural level.  If this is not done legally, it happens illegally on
 the black market.
 41.  The difference is this.  By regularizing prices, which
 inevitably follows from the overall logic of deductions for social
 insurance, and raising the prices of oil and coal, without which we
 cannot finance the development of basic sectors of the economy--this
 all has a chain-reaction effect --first, we fully compensate the
 population for the price increase implemented by the state. One for
 one.  Ruble for ruble.  We do not want to make a single kopek out of
 this. And, second, we then place this sum of prices under the
 state's control.
 42.  This is the kind of magnitude of the sums involved so that you
 can get a feel of the logic.  The volume of commodity turnover in our
 country is roughly 400 billion rubles [R]--these are annual sales.
 The increase in prices which we envisage amounts to R135 billion--
 approximately one-third of the total volume--and one-third goes to
 compensate the population, ruble for ruble, as I have already said.
 The state imposes a certain limit on all these prices, which are
 basic for the population-- they include foodstuffs, clothes,
 footwear, and cultural and domestic goods.  It places these prices
 under its control.  Some 30 percent of prices are under the control
 of the Union government, 40 percent are given over to the republics,
 and approximately 30 percent are given up to contract prices and free
 price formation.  After increasing expenditure and then compensating
 the population for it, we guarantee the continued production and
 sales of products to the population at firm prices.
 43.  A different option has been chosen in the program submitted by
 the president.  It states that prices will not be raised formally or
 administratively by the government but will change under the
 influence of supply and demand, i.e. market conditions.  It provides
 for limits on certain commodities and names a list of 150
 commodities.  They do not include bread, it is said, except for just
 two kinds, while the rest are free.  You do not particularly have to
 be a seer to understand that there will not be bread for 13 kopeks or
 "Orel" bread, but there will be all the rest, only more expensive,
 and no one will receive compensation for that.  There will be
 indexation, for, incidentally, our programs coincide with regard to
 indexation.  But if financial improvement, of which I have spoken, is
 unrealistic, prices will start to creep up, and it will be hard to
 control their growth.  And, according to our estimates, it will be
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 considerably higher than forecast.  True, there appear to be no
 guilty parties here.  Well, really, who is guilty?  Prices have risen
 by themselves.   The marketl  But this does not make things any easier
 for people.  Of course, if you draw a veil over this and do not focus
 attention on it, then the state appears to remain aloof here.
 44.  [Garifullina] Paying tribute to the government program, a deputy
 said that it candidly shows the ravines, but there are also catwalks
 by means of which it is possible to extricate oneself from the
 ravines.  Which of these "catwalks" strikes you personally as
 strongest?
 45.  [Abalkin] The extensive program of measures for financial
 improvement. The buildup of output through conversion, particularly
 of complex domestic equipment, which we want to throw onto the market
 in order to tie up money savings; the reduction of actual spending on
 defense, on production, of investments, and on aid to foreign states.
 46.  We are not abandoning the realization of the planned social
 programs, and so we are not reckoning on carrying out the period of
 financial improvement in 100 days, and it will be doing well if it
 takes only 18 months.  This coincides with the general logic of the
 moderate radical option: to improve things, but as painlessly as
 possible.  To improve things, but without treading on social
 programs.
 47.  There are the following niceties.  People say: "We will sell
 off state property, and so we will both achieve financial improvement
 and stabilize the market." But we have made a very professional
 analysis--involving excellent specialists--of the structure of
 savings.  A person holds money but cannot today buy a television set,
 a refrigerator, a washing machine, a suite of furniture, or a set of
 kitchen utensils.  He has put the money by and is waiting.  So if you
 sell a hairdressing salon, a laundry, or a poncho that was military
 property, someone will buy and some money will be drawn off, but the
 guy who put it by for a television set or a refrigerator will not buy
 shares.  All the same, this money will remain in the consumer market
 as pressing demand, and if we do not counter it with appropriate
 measures, it will not be reabsorbed.  But even if people buy some
 property, maybe this will reduce the sum of the investments that we
 now have, but it will not produce a great improvement and might even
 worsen the financial situation, because these are credit resources,
 the population's savings.  All the same, this whole mass that has
 been put by will await its turn.
 48.  [Garifullina] How does the government intend to protect us under
 market conditions?
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 49.  [Abalkin] We are making a very broad study of guarantees and
 measures of social protection, and we include such questions of
 social protection as ensuring employment, creating jobs and
 alternative forms of employment--which is very important under
 conditions of coming unemployment--retraining worker cadres....      The
 population's ecological protection also comes under the social block.
 Everything is written down in detail.  And, most importantly, we do
 not recognize the admissibility of curtailing social programs that
 have already been adopted.
 50.  [Garifullina] Leonid Ivanovich, do you consider it possible to
 adopt without discussion by the entire people a program which will
 abruptly change the political and economic situation in the country?
 And, incidentally, what is your attitude to the people's deputies'
 proposal to hold a referendum?
 51.  [Abalkin] A proposal to hold a referendum was advanced by the
 government back in May, when cardinal changes in the system of price
 formation were being discussed, and we went openly, although people
 said to us--you are committing suicide and you will not get support
 or trust.  But we replied that we wanted to play an honest game and
 so were ready to hold a referendum.  But the proposal was not
 adopted.  These are not such simple questions.  If, let us say, the
 government program is put to a nationwide referendum and if we
 receive support in that, then the government gets independence from
 the Supreme Soviet and even from the congress and we receive the
 highest mandate of confidence from the people and become independent
 in implementing economic policy.  Whoever has obtained the people's
 approval--and a referendum is the highest expression of the people's
 will--possesses such a right.  However, far from everyone was
 prepared to risk the government's getting the opportunity.  The
 overall distribution of sociopolitical forces and the struggle
 against the government had an influence.
 52.  A referendum demands preciseness, clarity, and simplicity.  A
 180-page program cannot be submitted for discussion.  And how to
 vote? I agree with this.  Two questions are ready for a referendum.
 The president himself spoke of one of them in his speech in the
 Supreme Soviet.  This is the question of private ownership of land, a
 most pointed question demanding a clear answer--for or against.
 53.  And the second question for a referendum, of which I spoke in my
 speech, is the question of the future state structure of the USSR.
 For or against preserving the USSR as a federative state.
 54.  It is clear, simple, and obvious.  And the people must make
 their choice unequivocally.  And then, having received the people's
 answer, it is necessary to stop all political games, for then no one
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 has the right to dispute the choice made by the people.  At least not
 for quite a while, within the life of a generation.
 55.  Matters really have now reached the extreme exacerbation of the
 situation, although perhaps I have not put it accurately--things
 probably have not reached that point.  People sometimes say: Things
 could not be worse.  Excuse me, but if we do not take decisive
 measures, do not instill order, and do not achieve concord in
 society, life as it is today will seem like paradise.
 56.  What can await us if we do not venture upon considered, well
 thought-out steps and do not achieve concord?  The prognosis is quite
 clear: The first crisis will break with the onset of winter and will
 escalate into a very strong public protest and disobedience.  If we
 still manage somehow to get through the winter, then a general
 collapse of economic ties will, I believe, ensue toward spring--by
 February-March.  This will be the most terrible political and
 economic crisis in the country, and it is already hard to predict the
 further consequences.
 57.  Today we have not yet reached the furthest line but are standing
 before it, and God forbid that we cross it, for then it will be too
 late to hold a referendum and then some other force must come and
 say: "Enough! Let us instill order." What is needed to prevent that
 happening is the maximum concord, awareness of our responsibility for
 the peoples' destinies, and readiness to assume it.  Then an
 opportunity will emerge to extricate the country from the crisis and
 from the impending threat of chaos.
 58.  [Garifullina] Leonid Ivanovich, does it not seem to you that the
 following problem is one of the causes of instability in the
 country--local Soviets and the center syndrome?
 59.  [Abalkin] Alas, it does exist. What is the matter here? A real
 demarcation of powers has occurred. A huge number of spheres of the
 national economy--the agro-industrial complex with all its sectors,
 housing and municipal services, and construction--have been
 transferred to the jurisdiction of local soviets in the republics.
 Some of them recently, but others long ago, like the bread-baking
 industry, for example.  But the center syndrome does exist: "Bus
 services in our city are bad. Which way is Ryzhkov's government
 looking?" A rough formula.  This has taken root and become the
 object of speculation.
 60.  People who either do not possess management skills or are unable
 to resolve specific questions, who"frequently arrived in the soviets
 riding on a wave of rally emotions and of attempts at destructive
 criticism of absolutely everything, are now trying to shirk
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 Document 7 of 12                                                 Page  13
 responsibility.  The operation of city transport and municipal
 services, preparations for winter, fruit and vegetable supplies to
 the city, the organization of the trade in bread, etc. are the
 direct, full, and exclusive province and responsibility of local
 organs of power.  It is essential to reject the center syndrome.
 Given your own irresponsibility and inability to cope with things,
 you must not shift the pointer of responsibility to those who have no
 bearing on local affairs.  This gives rise to a general atmosphere of
 nervousness and political instability.
 61.  [Garifullina] How do you forecast the development of events if
 one program or the other is adopted?
 62.  [Abalkin] First, if the government's program is adopted and,
 second, if terms on which the government will assume responsibility
 are accepted, a slow process of improvement awaits us.  A process
 extending over 18-24 months.  There will be gradual stabilization and
 the gradual resolution of tasks connected with saturating the
 consumer market.  This will not happen at once with regard to large
 goods.  There will begin--although also, maybe, not in an accelerated
 version--an upsurge of labor activeness, a new motivation mechanism
 will take shape, a thrifty attitude toward labor, property, and
 national assets will be revived, ecological crises will gradually be
 resolved, and there will be an equally slow and gradual restoration
 of the population's confidence in the ability of the country's
 leadership to emerge from the crisis.  The situation will be rough
 and even quite prone to zigzags, and the possibility of conflicts is
 not excluded.  A problem-free future hardly awaits us, but, on the
 other hand, there will be gradual improvement.
 63.  If we take the '11500 days" program in its initial form, I do
 not believe in it.  I consider it unrealistic and not feasible at the
 initial stage, and all the rest will follow from this.  If, as is
 proposed, all existing structures of management are destroyed without
 delay, ministries are eliminated without delay, and prices are set
 free, then it is possible to expect a collapse with the inevitable
 destruction of economic ties between regions and related enterprises.
 In many cases production will be paralyzed no later than the spring
 and, most likely, sooner--and there will be a considerable. slump in
 production.  The mothballing of construction projects will cause mass
 unemployment.  No protective mechanisms will be able to compensate
 for the splurge in prices.  Not only an economic but also a political
 crisis will develop and could either take the long drawn-out line
 toward still greater chaos and collapse or result in the removal from
 the political arena of the forces which authored this program and in
 the arrival of some new authoritative political structures.
 64.  1 would not like to meet with you in six months' time and say:
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 Document 7 of 12                                                Page  14
 See, I told you so.  I do not want that to happen.      But this is only
 possible if an attempt is not made to implement it.  And if it
 is...--no, I do not want that!  You must not win bets at the cost of
 the people's sacrifices.
 65.  But I am obliged to see this result as a citizen and a scientist
 and to struggle against this with all my might, which is what I am
 doing.  So far, it is true, without any particular success.
 66.  [Garifullina] Leonid Ivanovich, does the debate in parliament
 reassure you, and how do you assess it in general?
 67.  [Abalkin] Of course, the debate does not satisfy me very much. I
 observe this process at close quarters, and I feel that deputies are
 under quite tough pressure both from the drafters of the programs and
 from the press, which has expressed its opinion without even reading
 them.  And pressure resulting from the authority of Russia: "Look,
 they have adopted a program, so what about us?" And yet they voted
 without reading the second program at all.  It was clear to
 them--without reading itl--that it was bad!  Nonetheless, a deputy
 must demand respect for himself and only vote when everything is
 clear to him, when he has made the choice himself, not under
 pressure....

