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 Docusent 5 of 9                                              Page   1
 Classification:   UNCLASSIFIED       Status:       [STAY]
 Docutent Date:    14 Apr 91          Category:     [CAT]
 Report Type:      Daily Report       Report Date:
 Report Number:    FBIS-SOV-91-074    UDC Number:
 Author(s):  V. Vovnenko at the Air Defense Forces Main Headquarters;
 date not given--recorded]
 Headline:  Air Defense Forces Chief Tretyak Interviewed
 Source Line:  LD1404191791 Moscow Central Television First Program
 Network in Russian 0945 GMT 14 Apr 91
 Subslug:  [Interview with Army General Ivan Moiseyevich Tretyak,
 commander in chief of Air Defense Forces, by V. Vovnenko at
 the Air Defense Forces Main Headquarters; date not
 given--recorded]
 PULL TEST OF ARTICLB:
 1.  [Interview with Army General Ivan Moiseyevich Tretyak, commander
 in chief of Air Defense Forces, by V. Vovnenko at the Air Defense
 Forces Main Headquarters; date not given--recorded]
 2.  [Excerpts] [Vovnenko] Each year, in the second 10 days of April,
 the barrier at the restricted zone of the Air Defense Forces [PVO]
 Main Headquarters is raised for us. This time we arranged to meet
 Army General Ivan Moiseyevich Tretyak, commander in chief of the PVO
 troops. [passage omitted]
 3.  [Tretyak] Well, if we look here we see an establishment shift
 team of a formation command post. These kind of establishment teams
 are in all the formations and units.  We have them everywhere, and
 the viewers should know that all the comrades here are not especially
 selected here. This, I repeat, is an establishment team of which we
 have many. Everyone is well trained; everyone is a professional.
 4.  [Vovnenko) Could they conceal airspace violations from you, not
 report them to you, well, let us say, to avoid disturbing the
 commander in chief?
 5.  [Tretyak] No, they could not.
 6.  [Vovnenko] Is that out of the question?
 7.  [Tretyak] It is out of the question. There may be cases-- for
 instance, in the Imishli salient, in Azerbaijan, where Iranian
 agricultural aviation was operating and flew in at an altitude of
 some 30, 40, 50 meters. The radars cannot see at that altitude. The
 Approve  for Release   r Z
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 border troops reported it. That means I learn about it from the
 border troops, or rather information is passed through our system
 that we did not see that target. So you could not say we concealed
 it. We simply did not see it. It is impossible to conceal a target
 because it goes up on the plotting board both here and in my office;.
 we get it simultaneously. Whatever situation he has here, I get it on
 the same kind of board, but for the whole of the forces, both our
 aircraft that are airborne and reconnaissance aircraft. For instance,
 during the Team Spirit exercises in the east there were 10 or more
 Orion aircraft operating every day around the Sea of Okhotsk and the
 Kurils. We saw all of them. They were fully plotted on the board. We
 knew about them. When Mr. Cheney came here, we showed him at the
 command post of the Moscow District PVO where the aircraft were
 flying in the area of Alaska, Kamchatka, and the Kurils.  He could
 see for himself that we saw them. So there is no problem of that
 kind.
 8.  They may report it late, be late in providing the information.
 They may delay it, which is bad. For that. kind of thing we tell them
 off. He is supposed to provide data immediately. As soon as he has
 the data, he immediately passes it up, passes it on to the commander,
 and immediately makes a decision himself. He himself has to make a
 decision, because that is his job. The commander of the duty shift
 has to make a decision, and he does.
 9.  [Vovnenko] So, Ivan Moiseyevich, it seems that in fact your
 working day and your life around the clock takes place on a kind of
 map with coordinates, around which targets move all the time. How do
 you coge mentally?
 10.  [Tretyak] I think for me it is easier, as a participant in the
 Great Patriotic War, because there for four years we worked from dawn
 until dawn. There were no days off, no rest periods. Everything was
 done on the move, dynamically. Here it is a bit simpler because here
 we have certain rest periods. If, for instance, I go away, the duty
 shifts remain here and they report only when there is a clear
 violation either by our plane, or a hijack, or a violation by
 aircraft of adjoining states. They report those, but on the rest,
 they make decisions themselves.  From the beginning to the end of a
 working day I am with them, working.
 11.  [Vovnenko] Ivan Moiseyevich. What about the fact that the Warsaw
 Pact ceased to exist as of 1 April? How are we now going to defend
 the Western border?
 12.  [Tretyak] You see, the Warsaw Pact included something else. I
 was officially the air defense commanding officer a unified Warsaw
 Pact system. Now it is no longer there.  Now, so far, we only have
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 several countries working with us. The rest have pulled out.
 Naturally....
 13.  [Vovnenko, interrupting] Which ones have pulled out?
 14.  [Tretyak] Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Of course, we had
 our reconnaissance range perimeter 600-700 km further forward. Now it
 runs along the USSR state border, and naturally the whole system has
 to be reviewed. That is what we are doing so we can see ahead, but
 now our friends are putting forward proposals to conclude bilateral
 agreements. Not multilateral like we had, but each country with our
 country, so we mutually inform each other. We have nothing against
 this option, and for example, the Romanian comrades have arranged a
 meeting with us in May, where we are going to sign an agreement on
 joint information on the air situation ahead. We will be providing
 information to them from over the sea and the flanks. Obviously
 things are more complicated for us now. But, we can reorganize the
 system and that is what we are doing.
 15.  (Vovnenko] Could you please tell us whether the people who work
 here have had the experience of the latest in the Persian Gulf
 brought properly to their notice? Is it being studied? How well are
 you, as the PVO commander in chief, informed about what took place?
 16.  [Tretyak] As the PVO, we have to be ready to fight against air
 space attacks at any time of day or night.  Surprise plays a part
 here and raised combat readiness, or other states of readiness, is
 important so that we can at any moment go up against the enemy. That
 is the most important thing.
 17.  Well, as far as air forces were concerned, they had the [MiG]
 21's there, the 23's, and 25's, and even the 29's, but Husayn sent
 most of them to Iran. According to the data which we have, depending
 on their accuracy, only several planes were shot down by the air
 forces.
 18.  [Vovnenko] The rest (?went through) space systems?
 19.  [Tretyak] Space systems had only one role there. First, they
 gathered intelligence and monitored surface-to-surface operational
 tactical missiles, just as over-the-horizon stations did, and
 oriented their Patriot antiaircraft missile systems for firing. If
 one were to say that the Patriot is highly efficient, I would not
 agree.  Although at one time the Americans stated the Patriot was not
 meant to be an antimissile defense weapon, they now have shown the
 whole world that they developed it not only as an antiaircraft
 system, but an antimissile system as well.
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 20.  Their reconnaissance was very well deployed. There were the
 AWACS planes, there were the F-111E electronic countermeasures
 planes, the TR-1 reconnaissance planes, the RS-135 strategic
 reconnaissance planes.  Everyday there were up to 10 of them. They
 were there all the time watching Iraq completely. They were
 completely in charge of the situation. Naturally, of course, things
 were very difficult for the defending side. The conclusion for us is,
 of course, to have high combat readiness and such air defense assets
 as can fight against the new, most advanced air and space means of
 attack at any moment. [passage omitted]
 21.  [Vovnenko] Do you believe in UFO's?
 22.  [Tretyak] As yet I do not. I believe something else, that modern
 science and technology are capable of creating such spacecraft that
 could appear above us.
 23.  [Vovnenko] That is something I believe in too.
 24.  [Tretyak] This is something we have to keep an eye on.
 25.  [Vovnenko] You have to believe in man's ingenuity.
 26.  [Tretyak] SDT is a complicated thing, and the platforms that
 they are promising to make in their thousands are going to appear in
 every part of the world, and, they can be programmed to be at any
 altitude. So, we have to watch this carefully.
 27.  [Vovnenko] When there is talk about cutbacks in weapons, about
 conversion, even more and more often about cutting back the army, how
 is all this received by the country's PVO? What about that?
 28.  [Tretyak] If I am to be unequivocal, this is painful to us.
 They said the right thing, that quantitive cutbacks should be made up
 for in quality--that is, weapons. That is correct, but they have
 taken money away from us. I cannot buy from the state as much of this
 equipment as I need to make up the quality. All we have is the money
 they allocated to the minister of defense and which he passed on to
 us, the commanders in chief. Consequently, the rates of reequipment
 are going to be significantly slower and this will effect combat
 readiness.
 29.  Of course, our science has to keep up. The cutbacks in monies
 for scientific research work is also going to have an effect. And
 these have been cut back a lot. Things that are fine now will be
 obsolete in five to 10 years. They have to produce new, advanced
 things.
 I
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 30.  [Vovenko] Of course, over 10 years any progam would....
 31.  [Tretyak, interrupting] So here too it is a question of money.
 But we understand that the situation in the country is not easy. And
 for the time being, however much we might want it, the country cannot
 give anything even to the PVO troops which are on the very front line
 and are the first to go into battle, in the difficult conditions we
 are in now. Consequently we will have to maintain high combat
 readiness with what we have, maintain the technical state of all
 equipment, keep it well maintained, and be ready to carry out our
 tasks.

